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Abstract 
 
This study reviews regulatory instruments designed to reduce environmental externalities from the 
transport sector. We find that the main regulatory instruments used in practice are fuel economy 
standards, vehicle emission standards and fuel quality standards. While industrialized countries have 
introduced all three standards with strong enforcement mechanisms, most developing countries have yet 
to introduce fuel economy standards. The emission standards introduced by many developing countries to 
control local air pollutants follow either the EU or U.S. standards. Fuel quality standards, particularly for 
gasoline and diesel, have been introduced in many countries mandating 2 to 10 percents blending of 
biofuels, 10 to 50 times reduction of sulfur from 1996 levels and banning lead contents. Although 
inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs are in place in both industrialized and developing countries to 
enforce regulatory standards, these programs have faced several challenges in developing countries due to 
a lack of resources. The study also highlights several factors affecting the selection of regulatory 
instruments, such as countries’ environmental priorities and institutional capacities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Regulatory instruments are legal, enforceable, 'command and control' type 
instruments aimed at reaching desired, prescribed environmental quality targets or 
performance standards by regulating the behavior of individuals and/or firms (Seik, 
1996). In the transport sector, regulatory instruments induce adjustment of market 
participants’ behavior (e.g., purchasing more fuel efficient vehicles, lowering operator 
speeds, optimizing logistics in freight transport, changing the modal split) by 
establishing suitable incentives (Ahrens, 2008). Examples of these instruments include 
the following: Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards established in the 
United States in line with the 1975 Energy Policy Conservation Act; On-Road Vehicle 
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and Engine Emission Regulations established under the 1999 Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act; and European Union Emission Standards for Light Commercial 
Vehicles (i.e., Euro 2, Euro 3, and Euro 4 standards). Depending upon the primary 
objective, existing regulatory instruments target any of the following: (i) direct control 
of vehicular emissions or exhaust (e.g., emission standards in European Union, the 
United States, and many developing countries), (ii) reduction of fuel consumption (e.g., 
CAFE standards in the United States), (iii) cutting vehicle mileage (e.g., authorized 
mileage rates in the United Kingdom), (iv) lowering traffic congestion (e.g., the odd-
and-even license plate rule in Mexico city). Some of these instruments can spur 
technological innovations. For example, higher CAFE standards can force vehicle 
manufacturers to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles; emission or exhaust standards 
mandate vehicles to be fitted with less polluting engines and emission control systems. 
The key advantages of regulatory instruments are the directness and relative certainty 
of outcomes due to compliance measures. They boost economic competitiveness and 
environmental sustainability (Seik, 1996; Hricko 2004; Bartle and Vass, 2007). Strong 
regulatory programs and other regulatory efforts have had a significant effect on the 
control of air pollution in many countries (Ringquist, 1993). Regulatory measures alone, 
however, might not be sufficient to reduce vehicular emissions to the desired level. 
Therefore, effective pricing or fiscal policies, sound land use planning and the provision 
of environmentally sound public transportation systems can reinforce such regulatory 
measures (Faiz et. al, 1995). 
Despite well-established theoretical foundations and wide implementation in the 
industrialized nations, regulatory policy instruments still present several issues that 
require further investigation before their widespread introduction in the developing 
world. The most important issues confronting policy makers in the developing world 
include, but are not limited to, the following: Which regulatory policy instrument would 
be the most effective in their context? How to design the implementation mechanisms? 
Keeping this broad objective in the background, this study presents an in-depth review 
of various types of regulatory policy instruments, such as fuel economy standards; 
emissions and exhaust standards; fuel specification standards and inspection and 
maintenance programs1. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly introduces various types of 
regulatory instruments followed by a detailed discussion of fuel economy standards in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we review vehicle emission standards. Section 5 and Section 6 
present, respectively, fuel quality standards and inspection and maintenance programs. 
Section 7 discusses other laws and regulatory measures to control transport sector 
emissions. This is followed by discussions on key factors influencing the selection of 
regulatory instruments in Section 8. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 9. 
 
 
2. Types of Regulatory Instruments 
 
Regulatory instruments to control environmental externalities from the transport 
sector can be classified into different categories using different criteria. For example, 
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externalites, such as noise, accident, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Carbajo and Faiz (1994) classified the instruments into three categories based on the 
targets of the instruments. These categories are those targeting: (i) vehicle engines (e.g., 
fuel economy standards, emission standards and inspection and maintenance programs); 
(ii) fuel quality, such as contents of lead and sulfur and mandatory blending of biofuels; 
and (iii) transport demand (e.g., traffic management through vehicle bans and 
designating lanes for high occupancy vehicles). In this paper, we classify the 
instruments based on the purpose of the instruments. Our classification is as follows: (i) 
fuel economy standards, which aim at reducing fuel consumption and associated 
emissions, particularly, CO2; (ii) emission standards which are directly aimed at the 
reduction of specific emissions released after fuel consumption; (iii) fuel quality 
standards to reduce or eliminate emission causing elements before the combustion of 
fuel and (iv) other regulatory measures either discouraging vehicle utilization (e.g., full 
or partial bans) or encouraging high occupancy of the vehicles (e.g., HOV lans). 
Fuel economy standards refer to standards on vehicle mileage per unit of fuel 
consumption (i.e., km per liter or miles per gallon). These are common ways to control 
emissions from the transport sector (Faiz et al., 1995). The CAFE standards introduced 
in the United States are good examples of fuel economy standards. Fuel economy 
standards help increase energy efficiency of vehicles, thereby cutting fuel demand and 
associated emissions. While these standards could be effective in reducing fuel demand 
and emissions, they do not help in reducing congestion. Fuel economy standards also 
reduce emissions indirectly by cutting fuel consumption in the supply chain, such as 
crude oil drilling and production, pipeline and oil refinery. For example, Potter (2003) 
showed that, in the United Kingdom, out of total emissions from an average car, 76 
percent were from fuel usage, 9 percent from manufacturing of the vehicle, and the 
remaining 15 percent was from losses in the fuel supply system. 
Emission standards are aimed at directly reducing emissions, the exhaust coming out 
of the tail pipes of vehicles. These standards are different from fuel economy standards 
because they directly control emissions from vehicles, whereas the latter reduce 
emissions by reducing fuel demand. Fuel economy standards are aimed mainly at 
reducing fuel consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; however, emission 
standards control local air pollutants, such as suspended particulate matters (SPM), 
carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOCs) or non-metallic organic 
compounds (NMOC), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), etc. While fuel economy standards 
reduce local air pollution, emission standards do not necessarily reduce fuel 
consumption as emissions of local air pollutants can be reduced without curtailing fuel 
consumption by fitting emission controlling devices in vehicles. 
Fuel quality standards refer to limits on the content of substances that cause 
environmental pollution, such as sulfur and lead, in fuel. In order to control emissions of 
lead and sulfur from vehicular sources, the best approach is to remove these elements 
from fuels before burning. Regardless of the age or state of repair, lead emissions from 
all gasoline-fueled vehicles can be eliminated by discontinuing the addition of lead to 
gasoline. Likewise, emissions of oxides of sulfur (SOx)) can be abated by reducing the 
sulfur contents of fuels. 
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3. Fuel Economy Standards2 
 
The primary purpose of fuel economy standards is to reduce transport sector fuel 
demand through vehicle fuel efficiency improvements. A number of countries have 
introduced fuel economy standards, which help to reduce some types of emissions, such 
as CO2, that are directly linked to fuel consumption. While European Union (EU) and 
Japan have the most stringent fuel economy standards in the world, the United States 
and Canada had the lowest standards. China has more stringent standards than those of 
Australia, Canada and the United States (An and Sauer, 2004). 
 
3.1 Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards in the United States 
 
The CAFE standards require automobile manufacturers to meet stipulated standards 
for the sales-weighted fuel economy of light duty passenger vehicles sold and to 
maintain a distinct standard for passenger cars and light trucks (An and Sauer, 2004). 
Although CAFE is lauded as the main policy instrument to reduce transport sector 
emissions in the United States, it was, in fact, introduced from an energy security 
perspective in the mid-1970s. The impetus for CAFE was the oil crisis of 1973 (Proost 
and Van Dender, 2001). Title V of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 
passed by the U.S. Congress in 1975, set automobile fuel efficiency standards for the 
first time in the United States. CAFE was one of the outcomes of this Act (Faiz et al., 
1995; Kirby, 1995). 
CAFE standards were initially set for cars and light trucks (light vehicles) (DeCicco, 
1995). Currently, vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 1,000 or less 
are legally obliged to comply with CAFE standards (Komiyama, 2008). Consumers 
have responded to CAFE standard by switching from large cars to light trucks, a less- 
regulated class of vehicles (Godek, 1997). 
Minimum acceptable standards introduced by the EPCA began in 1978 at 18 mpg for 
passenger cars. By 1985, the fuel economy standard had increased to 27.5 mpg. Under 
intense pressure from lobbyists representing auto manufacturers, it was rolled back to 
26.5 mpg in 1986. Fuel efficiency standard returned to its previous level of 27.5 mpg in 
1989, where it has remained ever since (Kirby, 1995). The United States Congress, in 
2007, passed a comprehensive energy bill, The Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007, which includes a provision to achieve fuel economy of 35 miles per gallon 
(MPG) for new automobiles by 2020 (Komiyama, 2008). The evolution of U.S. CAFE 
standards illustrates a remarkable improvement in the average on-road fuel economy of 
new cars and light trucks in the country although the standards do not directly affect 
vehicles in use. Over time, the U.S. CAFE regulations increased fuel economy from an 
average 14 mpg in the mid-1970s to 21 mpg in the mid-1990s (Zachariadis, 2006). 
However, the drag that older vehicles impose on fuel efficiency appears to be quite 
substantial. The increase in the median age of registered automobiles (5.9 years in 1970 
to 7.5 years in 1990 and 9.0 years in 2001), less stringent regulation of light pickup 
trucks, vans, and sport/utility vehicles has depressed the growth in fuel efficiency 
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 For some countries/regions (e.g., EU) fuel economy standards are defined in terms of CO2/GHG 
emissions per kilometer/miles traveled. Although these standards can be classified as emission standards; 
we have included them in fuel standards because these standards are implemented through equivalent fuel 
economy standards. 
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(Crandall, 1992; de Palma and Kilani, 2008). For example, fuel efficiency of all 
vehicles on the road has increased by only 34 percent even though the fuel efficiency of 
new cars increased by 76 percent (Crandall, 1992). 
 
3.2 Fuel Economy Standards in Other Countries 
 
Besides the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the European Union, China and 
South Korea have also specified fuel economy standards for their vehicles. 
Australia: The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries (FCAI) first established 
voluntary fuel economy standards for new passenger cars sold in Australia in 1978 that 
lasted until 1987. However, those codes failed to achieve the desired targets 
(CONCAWE, 2006). In 1996, the Ministers for Transport and Primary Industries and 
Energy endorsed a second voluntary code of practice, which remained in force until July 
2001. FCAI members, under the second voluntary code, agreed to reduce the passenger 
car National Average Fuel Consumption (NAFC) to 8.2 L/100-km (approximately 29 
mpg) by the year 2000. In order to maintain the rate of improvement in NAFC achieved 
for the period up to the year 2000, a third voluntary fuel consumption agreement was 
reached between the FCAI and the government in 2003, which calls for reduction in 
fleet average fuel consumption for passenger cars by 18 percent by 2010.  
Canada: The federal government introduced a voluntary Company Average Fuel 
Consumption (CAFC) standard in 1976 for the new passenger vehicle fleet. In 1982, the 
fuel economy standards were made mandatory. These regulations are comparable to the 
U.S. CAFE standards. 
Japan: The Japanese government has established a set of fuel economy standards for 
gasoline and diesel powered light duty passenger and commercial vehicles. The targets 
to meet the standards are 2005 for diesel and 2010 for gasoline. The standards are based 
on average vehicle fuel economy by weight class. For gasoline vehicles, it varies from 
15 MPG for vehicles weighing more than 2,266 kg to 49.6 MPG for vehicles weighing 
less than 702 kg (An and Sauer, 2004). By 2010, the average fuel economy of gasoline 
vehicles is expected to increase by 23 percent from the 1995 level. Regulations for both 
light duty and heavy-duty diesel vehicles are structured differently. An average 
regulated emission limit value is used for certification and for production control. This 
limit is complemented by a slightly higher maximum permissible limit value that must 
be passed for each vehicle unit (Bauner et al., 2008). Assuming no change in the vehicle 
mix, the targets for diesel vehicles call for a 14 percent fuel economy improvement 
compared to the 1995 fleet (11.6 km/l versus 10 km/l). 
European Union (EU): After an agreement between the European Commission (EC) 
and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) in 1998 and similar 
agreements with the Japanese and Korean manufacturers (JAMA and KAMA) in 1999, 
the EU automobile industry committed to a target by 2008/2009. The major provisions 
of the ACEA Agreement, signed in March 1998, include a CO2 emission target of 140 g 
CO2/km, representing a 25 percent reduction from the 1995 level of 186 g CO2/km, to 
be reached by 2008 with the possibility of an extension of the agreement to 120 g 
CO2/km by 2012 (Dieselnet, 2005). The difference between the agreements signed by 
the European Commission (EC) with the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (ACEA) in 1998 and with the Japanese and Korean manufacturers in 1999 
is that the target of 140 g CO2/km is delayed by one year, to 2009, for, JAMA and 
KAMA (Dieselnet, 2005). 
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3.3 Impacts of Fuel Economy Standards on Fuel Consumption and Emissions 
 
The impacts of fuel economy standards on fuel consumption (Geller et al., 1992; 
Goldberg, 1998; Greene, 1998) and emission reduction (Decicco, 1995) are helpful in 
assessing the performance of these standards and their suitability for replication in 
developing countries. Parry et al. (2004) used the Arizona I/M program data collected in 
1995 and 2002 on car and truck emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOC), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO) to study the effects of fuel economy 
standards on emission rates in the United States. They found emission rates were 
significantly affected by fuel economy standards in 1995 but not so in 2002. This is 
mainly because the projected CO, hydrocarbon (HC) and NOx emissions per mile for 
cars and trucks with certified fuel economy of 20 and 30 mpg are virtually 
indistinguishable over vehicle lifetimes. Based on their findings, they proposed that 
lifetime emission rates are equivalent for different cars and for different light trucks. 
Using a vehicle stock turnover model, Decicco (1995) estimated the effect of enhanced 
fuel economy standards on gasoline consumption, GHG emissions, and hydrocarbon 
emissions for light duty vehicles in the United States. The author found that an 
improvement of 6 percent per year in fuel economy would result in savings of 2.9 
million barrel of gasoline per day and 147 million metric tons of annual carbon emission 
avoidance. Likewise, using in-use emission data collected by remote sensing, 
Harrington (1997) demonstrated a strong association between better fuel economy and 
lower emissions of carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrocarbon (HC), which gets even 
stronger as vehicles age. 
Despite the considerable amount of research done on the effects of CAFE on fuel 
consumption and other related factors, there is no universal consensus on the effects of 
the CAFE program on the fuel economy of the U.S. vehicle fleet, the overall safety of 
passenger vehicles, the health of the domestic automobile industry, employment in that 
industry, and the well-being of consumers (NSC, 2002). Greene (1998) estimated that 
CAFE standards have led to about a 50 percent increase in on-road fuel economy for 
light duty vehicles during the period 1975-1995. Improvement in fuel economy forced 
by the CAFE standards has resulted in an overall decrease in motor fuel expenditure. 
This means that consumers, in the late1990s, spent over $50 billion per year less on fuel 
than what they actually would have spent at 1975 mpg levels. By contributing to 
increased fuel economy, the CAFE program has reduced dependence on imported oil, 
improved the nation’s terms of trade, and reduced CO2 emissions relative to what 
otherwise would have been (NSC, 2002). 
Although the overall goal of CAFE regulation has shifted from reducing fuel 
consumption in a period of high oil prices to reducing harmful emissions, positive 
environmental gains resulting from CAFE standard has drawn flak from various 
quarters (Goldberg, 1998). Dowlatabadi et al. (1996) demonstrated that enhanced CAFE 
standards might have little or no effect on urban air pollution and a less than 
proportional reduction in GHG emissions. They argued that CAFE is not the most cost 
effective way of lowering nitric oxide (NO), volatile organic compounds (VOC) and 
GHG emissions. Portney et al. (2003) asserted that by reducing gallons/mile, the CAFE 
standards make driving cheaper, which might lead to an overall increase in pollution. 
Crandall (1992) ranked the effectiveness of a carbon tax, a petroleum tax, and CAFE 
standards in terms of their ability to reduce greenhouse gases. He considered a carbon 
tax to be much more efficient than a petroleum tax. CAFE, according to Crandall, 
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would cost the economy at least 8.5 times as much as a carbon tax with equivalent 
effects on carbon emissions. The inefficiency of the CAFE is mainly because of its 
failure to equate the marginal costs of reducing fuel consumption across all uses, 
including usage of older vehicles and non-vehicular consumption. Using an empirically 
rich simulation model and cost estimates for anticipated fuel economy technologies, 
Austin and Dinan (2005), compared the cost of the higher CAFE standards against the 
cost of a gasoline tax that would save the same amount of gasoline. Their findings 
suggested that a gasoline tax would produce greater immediate savings by encouraging 
people to drive less and, eventually, to choose more-fuel-efficient vehicles. Fischer 
(2008) and West and Williams (2005) concurred with Austin and Dinan’s assertion that 
gasoline taxes are a more efficient means to reduce fuel consumption than mandating 
fuel economy increases. 
Increased vehicle miles traveled due to enhanced fuel economy is another aspect that 
some studies, such as Dowlatabadi et al. (1996), Bamberger (2002) and Portney et al. 
(2003), found to be problematic. An increase in VMT also means an increase in 
congestion and crash costs (CBO, 2003), and an increase in the overall cost of driving 
(Bamberger, 2002). Nivola and Crandall (1995) argued against the effectiveness of 
CAFE in reducing vehicle miles traveled and labeled CAFE as a problematic 
experiment. They argued that the United States would have saved at least as much oil, 
by reducing miles driven in all types and vintages of vehicles, at about a third the 
economic cost, if a fee of just 25 cents a gallon had been added to the cost of gasoline 
nine years ago. Wang (1994) proposed a marketable permit scheme for light duty 
vehicle manufacturers as a more efficient alternative to the existing CAFE standards. 
For CAFE to be more effective, Portney et al. (2003) suggested the adoption of tradable 
fuel economy (FE) permits among manufacturers, revision of the criterion for 
distinction between cars and light trucks, and removal of distinctions between domestic 
and imported vehicle fleets. 
Several studies (Greene, 1991; NRC 2002; Greene and Hopson, 2003) have measured 
the welfare effects of fuel economy regulations by estimating lifetime fuel saving 
benefits and subtracting the added vehicle costs from it. Welfare studies widely differ 
not only in magnitude but also in the direction of the welfare effect. Kleit (2004) 
demonstrated that a long-run MPG increase in the CAFE standard not only causes a 
huge welfare loss but that it is also an inefficient instrument for conserving fuel. He 
found that a long-run 3.0 MPG increase in the CAFE standard leads to $4 billion of 
welfare loss per year and 5.2 billion gallons of gasoline savings per year. He shows that 
the same amount of fuel can be conserved with an increase in the gasoline tax of 11 
cents per gallon. The overall welfare loss resulting from such an increase would be $290 
million per year or about one-fourteenth of the cost imposed in the former case. 
Dowlatabadi et al. (1996) argued against further increasing CAFE standards. They 
maintain that fuel savings from increasing CAFE are subjected to diminishing returns. 
West and Williams (2005) showed that an interaction with the tax-distorted labor 
market causes the cost advantage of the gas tax over the CAFE standard to be higher 
than anticipated. In such a context, increasing the gas tax would very likely lead to 
welfare gain, whereas welfare loss is almost certain if the CAFE standard is tightened. 
Table 1 presents the impacts of CAFE standards on fuel savings and job losses. The 
CAFE standards might be considered successful in enhancing fuel economy but the 
gains achieved through CAFE standards have been undermined by the growth in vehicle 
fleet: The policy has not been able to reduce overall fuel demand due to the rapid 
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growth of the vehicle fleet. Gallagher et al. (2007) pointed out the ineffectiveness of 
CAFE in terms of ensuring energy security. They argued that, although CAFE standards 
are politically attractive and induce innovation among other things, it might not be the 
right policy instrument when it comes to ensuring energy security through reduced fuel 
consumption. Total motor vehicle fuel consumption in the United States has increased 
by 60 percent since the enactment of the CAFE program. Enhanced fuel economy 
standards may have propelled more driving – the so-called “rebound” effect – 
increasing the total vehicle miles traveled. Greening et al. (2000), however, argued that 
the increase in travel resulting from the decrease in cost per mile and reduced fuel 
intensity arising from the CAFE standards is minimal. 
Table 1: Macroeconomic and Welfare Impacts of Fuel Economy Standards of US CAFE Standards. 
Study Approach Estimated Impacts 
Dacy et al. (1980) INFORUM 
input–output 
model 
A net increase in employment of 140,000 jobs by 1985 
due to CAFÉ standards; job losses in steel, petroleum and 
gas, and wholesale and retail trade sector are offset by 
new jobs created in various service industries, plastics, 
metal stampings, and other sectors. 
Motor Vehicles 
Manufacturers 
Association 
(1990) 
 The loss of between 159,000 and 315,000 jobs 
in the motor vehicle industry 
Geller et al. 
(1992) 
Input–output 
model 
Fuel savings of $54 billion (1990 dollar) 
Increasing the fuel efficiency of passenger cars from 28 
mpg in 1990 to 40mpg in 2000 and 50 mpg in 2010 would 
create 244,000 by 2010 
Goldberg 
(1998) 
 Reduced fuel consumption by 19 million gallons per year; 
the gasoline tax would have to increase by 780 percent, or 
80 cents per gallon, to achieve the same fuel savings as 
the CAFE standards. 
Source: Bezdek and Wendling (2005). 
 
Goldberg (1998) and Parry et al. (2004) argued that welfare gains depend upon 
myriad factors such as ability of the CAFE to function as a set of internal taxes on fuel 
inefficient vehicles, subsidies on fuel-efficient vehicles, local pollution, nationwide 
congestion, traffic accidents, and how consumers value fuel economy technologies and 
their opportunity costs. CAFE, according to Goldberg (1998), may not fare that badly 
from a welfare point of view because of its ability to function as a set of internal taxes 
(on fuel inefficient) and subsidies (on fuel-efficient vehicles) within each firm. Based on 
the estimates of CAFE’s impact on local pollution, nationwide congestion, and traffic 
accidents, Parry et al.(2004) found that, contingent upon how consumers value fuel 
economy technologies and their opportunity costs, higher fuel economy standards can 
produce anything from significant welfare gains, to very little or no effect, to significant 
welfare losses. Using marginal oil dependency and carbon externalities value of $0.16 
and $0.12 per gallon respectively, they demonstrated that the reduction in fuel demand 
induced by improved fuel economy is welfare improving only when the marginal 
external costs of carbon emissions and oil dependency exceed the product of the 
existing fuel tax and the marginal social value of fuel tax revenues. 
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4. Vehicle Emission Standards 
 
The implementation of emission standards is the most direct way of reducing 
emissions per VMT (Walsh, 1992).Without introducing emission standards, policies 
aimed at reducing fuel consumption and enhancement of fuel economy may not be 
sufficient to contain local air pollutant from the transport sector (ADB, 2003). Olsson 
(1994) argued that stringent emission standards lower emissions by forcing the auto 
industry to derive new vehicle technologies. Emission standards have been introduced 
in practice in many countries since 1970s. However, levels of emission standards, 
vehicle coverage, and monitoring and enforcement differ across countries. Here, we 
briefly discuss a few examples of emission standards introduced in selected 
countries/states. 
 
4.1 Emission Standards in the United States 
 
In the United States, Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970, calling for the first 
tailpipe emissions standards to control specifically carbon monoxide (CO), volatile 
organic compounds (VOC), and oxides of nitrogen (NOx). In 1975, the new standards 
were put into effect with a NOx standard for cars and light duty trucks of 3.1 grams per 
mile (gpm). In order to make the Act more effective, Congress amended the Act and 
further tightened emission standards in 1977. The NOx standard, between 1977 and 
1979, was reduced from 3.1 gpm to 2.0 gpm for cars. In order to meet the Clean Air Act 
requirements, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set the first tailpipe 
standards for light duty trucks at 1.7 gpm in 1979 and for heavier trucks at 2.3 gpm in 
1988. Effective in 1988, the standards for light duty trucks were lowered to 1.2 gpm 
(USEPA, 1999). 
Tier 1 Emission Standards in the United States: In 1990, Congress amended the 
Clean Air Act. Emission standards were further tightened to counter the additional 
pollution resulting from the increase in vehicle stock. Published as a final rule on June 
5, 1991, Tier 1 standards were implemented between 1994 and 1997. Effective in 1994, 
the NOx standard was set at 0.6 gpm for cars (USEPA, 1999). The Tier 1 vehicle 
emission standards (0.25 grams per mile non-methane hydrocarbons (NMHC) for light 
duty vehicles, which were introduced progressively from 1994 onwards in the United 
States, became obsolete after the 2003 model year with a phase-in implementation of 
Tier 2 standard schedule from 2004 to 2009 (Gwilliam et al., 2004). 
Tier 2 Emission Standards in the United States: The EPA proposed Tier 2 tailpipe 
emissions standards in 1999 that were to be implemented in 2004. For the first time, 
both cars and light duty trucks were subject to the same national pollution control 
system. The same emissions standards apply to all vehicle weight categories. For 
example, cars, minivans, light-duty trucks, and SUVs have the same emission limit. Tier 
2 set the new standard at 0.07 gpm for NOx, a 77 to 86 percent reduction for cars. In 
order to take full advantage of vehicle emission control technologies, the EPA also 
proposed a reduction in average sulfur levels to 30 parts per million (ppm) (USEPA, 
1999) from the then average of more than 300 ppm. As a comprehensive national 
control program meant to regulate vehicles and their fuel as a single system, the Tier 2 
Emission Standards pursue significant emission reductions (Gwilliam et al., 2004). Tier 
2 regulations are more stringent than Tier 1 requirements, and they further extend the 
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application of the standards to include some of the heavier vehicle categories that were 
not included in Tier 1 standards (Dieselnet, 2005). 
In order to understand how the Tier 2 program works, it is necessary to understand the 
EPA’s classification of light duty vehicles and trucks. Vehicles and trucks under 8500 lb 
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) are classified as light duty vehicles. 
Table 2: Tier 2 Light Duty Full Useful Life Exhaust Emission Standards 
[Emission Limits (g/mile)] 
Bin no NOx NMOG CO HCHO PM Notes 
11 0.9 0.28 7.3 0.032 0.12 (1) 
10 0.6 0.156 (0.230) 4.2 (6.4) 0.018 (0.027) 0.08 (2,3,4) 
9 0.3 0.090 (0.180) 4.2 0.018 0.06 (3,5) 
8 0.2 0.125 (0.156) 4.2 0.018 0.02 (2,6) 
7 0.15 0.09 4.2 0.018 0.02  
6 0.1 0.09 4.2 0.018 0.01  
5 0.07 0.09 4.2 0.018 0.01  
4 0.04 0.07 2.1 0.011 0.01  
3 0.03 0.055 2.1 0.011 0.01  
2 0.02 0.01 2.1 0.004 0.01  
1 0 0 0 0 0  
Notes: (1) Bin 11 is only for MDVPs and is available up to and including the model year. 
(2) Bin deleted at the end of 2006 model year (2008 for HLDTs). 
(3) The higher temporary NMOG, CO, and HCHO values apply only to HDLTs and expire after 2008. 
(4) Optional temporary NMOG standard of 0.280 g/mile applies for qualifying LDT4s and MDVPs only. 
(5) Optional Temporary NMOG standard of 0.130 g/mile applies for LDT2s only. 
(6) Higher temporary NMOG standard is deleted at the of 2008 model year. 
Source: CONCAWE, 2006. 
 
Under the Tier 2 programme, manufacturers select a set of full useful life standards 
from the same row also called (“emission bin” or “bin”) for a given test group of light 
duty vehicles (LDVs) and light duty trucks (LDTs). The way it works is that, under the 
“emission bin” approach, manufacturers select a set of emission standards (a bin) to 
comply with, as a result of which test groups are obliged to meet all standards within 
that particular bin. For example: If a manufacturer aims for Bin 5 for its light duty diesel 
vehicles and cannot meet the target, the higher bins in that case allow a safety factor. It 
is the manufacturer’s responsibility now to offset the higher bin models with similar 
volumes of lower bin vehicles (CONCAWE, 2006). In addition, the Tier 2 vehicles are 
obliged to meet the requirements of one of the available “emission bin” and a full life 
NOx standard of 0.07 g/miles (CONCAWE, 2006). 
California Emission Standards: Among the states in the U.S., California tends to be 
the leader in imposing increasingly stringent environmental regulations. In 1989, the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB), in response to severe air pollution problems in 
Los Angeles and other major cities in California, established stringent, technology-
forcing vehicle emission standards to be phased in between the period of 1994 and 2003 
(Faiz et. al., 1995). As California began to regulate vehicle emissions earlier than the 
Federal government, it is treated differently than the other states when it comes to The 
discretion to adopt its own unique vehicle emissions control program. Under the Clean 
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Air Act in 1970, California is allowed to set its own emissions standards (ECMT, 2000). 
The LEV II regulations, which were formally adopted on 5 August 1998 and came into 
operation on 27 November 1999, are the current standards for California (See table 3 & 
4) (CONCAWE, 2006). 
Table 3: LEV II Exhaust Emissions Standards-Light and Medium Duty Vehicles. 
[All Private cars & Light Duty Trucks < 8500 lb GVW] 
Category 50,000 miles 
 
NMOG CO NOx PM HCHO 
LEV 0.075 3.4 0.05 - 0.015 
ULEV 0.04 1.7 0.05 - 0.008 
SULEV - - - - - 
  
 120,000 miles 
 
NMOG CO NOx PM HCHO 
LEV 0.090 4.2 0.07 0.01 0.018 
ULEV 0.055 2.1 0.07 0.01 0.011 
SULEV 0.010 1.0 0.02 0.01 0.004 
Note: Limits are for intermediate life of 5 yrs or 50,000 or full useful life of 10, 0000 miles or 10 years. 
Source: CONCAWE, 2006. 
Table 4: LEV II Exhaust Emissions Standards- Medium Duty Vehicles (MDVs). 
Type (Weight 
(GVWR), lbs.) 
Durability 
Mileage 
 Emission 
category NMOG CO NOx PM HCHO 
8,500 - 10,000 12,000  LEV 0.195 6.4 0.2 0.12 0.032 
  
 ULEV 0.143 6.4 0.2 0.06 0.016 
  
 SULEV 0.1 3.2 0.1 0.06 0.008 
 
        
10,001 - 14,000 12,000  LEV 0.23 7.3 0.4 0.12 0.04 
  
 ULEV 0.167 7.3 0.4 0.06 0.021 
  
 SULEV 0.117 3.7 0.2 0.06 0.01 
Note: Light duty trucks up to 8,500 lbs GVWR, and medium-duty vehicles that are up to 14,000 lbs 
GVWR fall under the CA LEV-II standards adopted by California. LEV, ULEV and SULEV stand for, 
respectively, low-emission vehicles, ultra low- emission vehicles and super ultra-low emission vehicles. 
The LEV II standards indicate the maximum exhaust emission limits for the intermediate and full useful 
life of LEVs, ULEVs, and SULEVs. It also includes fuel-flexible, bi-fuel, and duel fuel vehicles when 
operating on the gaseous or alcohol fuels. 
Source: CONCAWE, 2006. 
 
4.2 Emission Standards in Canada 
 
The Canadian government, on 12 December 2002, under the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act of 1999, published its new On-Road Vehicle and Engine Emission 
Regulations, which is being applied to vehicles and engines that are manufactured or 
imported into Canada on or after January 1, 2004. The regulations are similar to 
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established emission standards and test procedures for on-road vehicles in the United 
States (CONCAWE, 2006). 
 
4.3 Vehicle Emission Regulations in Europe 
 
In Europe, it was the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) 
that formulated emission regulations in the 1970s and early 1980s (CONCAWE, 2006). 
The motor vehicle emission regulations developed by the ECE were then adopted by 
individual member states (Faiz et al., 1995). Although in the early years the European 
Union (EU) adopted regulations that were almost identical with the ECE equivalents, 
EU has since become proactive in formulating vehicle emission standards. Under the 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome, EU member states are legally obliged to follow EU 
regulations (CONCAWE, 2006). In order to make the existing regulations for light duty 
vehicles more stringent, the EU council of Ministers, in March 1994, adopted EU 
Directive 94/12/EC. The new emission limits were applied starting 1 January 1996 for 
new models and 1 January 1997 for existing models. Unlike previous regulations, it set 
separate standards for gasoline and diesel-fueled vehicles (CONCAWE, 2006). Tables 5 
and 6 below display the EU’s commitment to reducing the transport sector emissions: 
The EU has, over time, adopted tougher standards for all vehicular pollutants. 
Table 5: EU Emission Standards for Passenger Cars (Category M1*), g/km. 
Tier Date CO HC HC+NOx NOx PM 
Diesel 
      
Euro 1†  1992.07 2.72 (3.16) - 0.97 (1.13) - 0.14 (0.18) 
Euro 2, IDI  1996.01 1 - 0.7 - 0.08 
Euro 2, DI  1996.01a 1 - 0.9 - 0.1 
Euro 3  2000.01 0.64 - 0.56 0.5 0.05 
Euro 4  2005.01 0.5 - 0.3 0.25 0.025 
Euro 5  2009.09b 0.5 - 0.23 0.18 0.005e 
Euro 6  2014.09 0.5 - 0.17 0.08 0.005e 
 
     
Petrol (Gasoline) 
     
Euro 1†  1992.07 2.72 (3.16) - 0.97 (1.13) - - 
Euro 2  1996.01 2.2 - 0.5 - - 
Euro 3  2000.01 2.3 0.2 - 0.15 - 
Euro 4  2005.01 1 0.1 - 0.08 - 
Euro 5  2009.09b 1 0.10c - 0.06 0.005d,e 
Euro 6  2014.09 1 0.10c - 0.06 0.005d,e 
Notes: * At the Euro 1..4 stages, passenger vehicles > 2,500 kg were type approved as Category N1 
vehicles. 
† Values in brackets are conformity of production (COP) limits. 
a - until 1999.09.30 (after that date DI engines must meet the IDI limits). 
b - 2011.01 for all models. 
c - and NMHC = 0.068 g/km. 
d - applicable only to vehicles using DI engines. 
e - proposed to be changed to 0.003 g/km using the PMP measurement procedure. 
Source: Dieselnet (undated). 
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Table 6: EU Emission Standards for Light Commercial Vehicles, g/km. 
Category Tier Date CO HC HC+NOx NOx PM 
Diesel 
       
N1, Class I ≤ 1305 kg Euro 4 2005.01 0.5 - 0.3 0.25 0.025 
 Euro 5 2009.09b 0.5 - 0.23 0.18 0.005e 
 Euro 6 2014.09 0.5 - 0.17 0.08 0.005e 
        
N1, Class II 
(1305-1760 kg) Euro 4 2006.01 0.63 - 0.39 0.33 0.04 
 Euro 5 2010.09c 0.63 - 0.295 0.235 0.005e 
 Euro 6 2015.09 0.63 - 0.195 0.105 0.005e 
        
N1, Class III > 1760 kg Euro 4 2006.01 0.74 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.06 
 Euro 5 2010.09c 0.74 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.005e 
 Euro 6 2015.09 0.74 0.215 0.215 0.125 0.005e 
        
Petrol (Gasoline) 
       
N1, Class I ≤ 1305 kg Euro 4 2005.01 1 0.1 - 0.08  
 Euro 5 2009.09b 1 0.10f - 0.06 0.005d,e 
 Euro 6 2014.09 1 0.10f - 0.06 0.005d,e 
        
N1, Class II 
(1305-1760 kg) Euro 4 2006.01 1.81 0.13 - 0.1  
 Euro 5 2010.09c 1.81 0.13g - 0.075 0.005d,e 
 Euro 6 2015.09 1.81 0.13g - 0.075 0.005d,e 
        
N1, Class III > 1760 kg Euro 4 2006.01 2.27 0.16 - 0.11  
 Euro 5 2010.09c 2.27 0.16h - 0.082 0.005d,e 
 Euro 6 2015.09 2.27 0.16h - 0.082 0.005d,e 
Notes: † For Euro 1/2 the Category N1 reference mass classes were Class I ≤ 1250 kg, 
Class II 1250-1700 kg, Class III > 1700 kg. 
a - until 1999.09.30 (after that date DI engines must meet the IDI limits). 
b - 2011.01 for all models. 
c - 2012.01 for all models. 
d - applicable only to vehicles using DI engines. 
e - proposed to be changed to 0.003 g/km using the PMP measurement procedure. 
f - and NMHC = 0.068 g/km. 
g - and NMHC = 0.090 g/km. 
h - and NMHC = 0.108 g/km. 
Source: CONCAWE, 2006. 
 
The European emissions standards have become stricter with the adoption of newer 
Euro limit values. The EU has gradually tightened catalyst-forcing standards for new 
gasoline-fueled cars (also called Euro 1 standards) since its adoption in the early 1990s 
and adopted Euro 2, Euro 3, and Euro 4 in 1996, 2000, and 2005 respectively. It also 
adopted similar requirements for diesel cars and light and heavy commercial vehicles 
(ADB, 2003). In response to the ongoing planned and probable control measures across 
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the European Union (EU), by the year 2010, vehicular emission in Europe are expected 
to fall markedly (Reis et al., 2000). The maximum permissible limits set by Euro 3 
called for 30 percent reduction of carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC) and 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and 80 percent reduction of particulate matter (PM) emissions. 
Euro 5 regulations, which new models were obliged to meet starting October 1, 2008, 
and new registrations of vehicle models certified earlier are supposed to meet starting 
October 1, 2009, are even more stringent. NOx emission limits are further reduced, by 
60 percent compared to Euro 3 (Bauner et al., 2008). Because of the voluntary 
agreement between the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) and 
the European Commission, the former are obliged to reduce the fuel consumption and 
average unit emissions of CO2 of new private cars, both gasoline and diesel, by 21 
percent from the period of 1995 to 2008 (Joumard, 2005). 
Emission standards alone will not be able to constrain car usage and associated 
emissions. With an increase in living standards, consumer preferences do shift 
considerably. In the EU, while Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 2.5 percent 
between 1970 and 1997, annual passenger and freight transport averages increased by 
an average of 2.8 and 2.6 percent (Walsh, 2000). A gradual shift in consumers’ 
preference towards new low emission car purchases might be able to slow down the rise 
in emissions level but more cars on roads also means more congestion and emissions. In 
addition to the enforcement of stringent emission standard, the following measures 
should be implemented to improve the effectiveness of emissions control policies: (i) 
measures such as the use of renewable or non-fossil based fuels and alternative 
technologies such as fuel cells and gasoline-electric hybrid engine; (ii) shift to less 
energy intensive modes and reductions in travel, (iii) technological improvements in 
fuel economy; and, (iv), an increase in load factors (Scholl et. al., 1996; Dargay and 
Gately, 1997; Kosugia et. al., 2005). 
 
4.4 Vehicle Emissions Standards in Latin America 
 
Like other developing countries, Latin American countries have witnessed rapid 
growth in transport sector emissions. Urban air quality has deteriorated with an increase 
in the number of vehicles on urban roadways. In Buenos Aires, for example, the 
transport sector accounts for over 99 percent of CO emissions and 46 percent of the 
NOx emissions (Venegas and Mazzeo, 2006). The situation in Brazil is quite similar. In 
2004, transport sector emissions accounted for 46 percent of total HC and 98 percent of 
total CO in the Saõ Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA) (Vivancoa and Andradeb, 2006). 
In Santiago, Chile, older cars and diesel-powered vehicles are the main contributors to 
CO and NOx concentrations. Between 1990 and 2000, they accounted for 65 percent of 
total urban air emissions (Jorquera, 2002). In Mexico City, the transport sector 
accounted for 98 percent of total CO emissions, 40 percent of total HC emissions, and 
81 percent of total NOx emissions (Molina and Molina, 2002). 
In response to rapidly deteriorating urban air quality, Latin American countries have 
initiated or adopted emission standards. The stringency of the standards, however, 
varies across countries/cities depending upon the level of air pollution and other factors. 
As outlined in Table 7, many Latin American countries have imposed complete or 
partial bans on used vehicles imports. Despite a huge market for used vehicles, 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
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Uruguay, and Venezuela have completely banned used vehicle imports (Pelletiere and 
Reinert, 2002). 
Table 7: Latin America Vehicle Standards. 
Country  Vehicle Standards 
 Imported Locally Manufactured 
Argentina Only new vehicles, equipped 
with emission control 
technologies according to 
Euro 3 standards 
As of 2006, new light duty vehicles must comply 
with Euro 3, Euro 4 as of 2009, likewise for new 
diesel trucks and buses. 
Brazil No importation of used 
vehicles; imported new 
vehicles must meet Euro 4 
standards 
Vehicle emissions standards set by IBAMA, 
based on Euro standards: Euro 2 implemented in 
1993, Euro 4 planned for 2008 equivalent to 
PROCONVE IV standard), and Euro 4 in 2009. All 
new trucks and buses must be Euro 4 in 2009. 
Chile Importation of used vehicles 
is banned. 
Emissions testing programs started in 1994 
(annual and roadside inspections). Euro 3 
standards introduced in 2004, Euro 4 to start in 
2009 for passenger cars. Euro 4 for diesel light 
vehicles required from 2005. 
Colombia Importation of used vehicles 
is banned. 
Light duty petrol vehicles must meet USEPA 1987 
standards. New vehicles must comply with Euro 
1; heavy duty diesel vehicles must comply with 
equivalent of USEPA 1994 standards for buses 
and 1991 standards for other vehicles. New 
buses must comply with Euro 2, other new heavy 
duty vehicles with Euro 1. 
Ecuador Importation of used vehicles 
is banned. Model 2000 and 
newer cars must possess 
catalytic converters 
New light duty petrol vehicles must meet 
USEPA 1987 standards or Euro 1; new heavy 
duty 
diesel vehicles must comply with USEPA 1994 
standards or Euro 2. 
Mexico Vehicle maxium 10 years, 
must have a gasoline 
engine, and must be 
equipped 
with a catalytic converter 
Since 1993, heavy duty diesel vehicles must meet 
one of these standards: US 1998, US 2004, Euro 
3, or Euro 4. All light duty and passenger vehicles 
must meet US Tier 1, except on NOx (levels vary) 
and PM (applies only to diesel). 
Paraguay Importation of used vehicles 
is banned. 
 
Venezuela Importation of used vehicles 
is banned. 
Emissions testing in certain areas, with fines for 
violators. 
Source: UNEP (2008). 
 
Table 8 shows the emission standards adopted by selected countries in Latin America. 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have chosen to adopt EU standards, whereas Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Mexico have provided flexibility by adopting both the U.S. equivalents 
and EU standards. As compared to Argentina and Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have 
introduced more stringent emission standard. 
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Table 8: Emission Standards in selected Latin American countries. 
Country Vehicle type Effective 
Date 
CO 
(g/km) 
HC 
(g/Km) 
NOx 
(g/km) 
PM 
(g/km)(1) 
Argentina New Vehicles 1/1/1995 12 1.2 1.4 0.373 
 All imports 1/1/1997(2) 2 0.3 0.6 0.124 
 All new regular 1/1/1998 6.2 0.5 1.43 0.16(3) 
       
Brazil Cars 1/1/1992 24 2.1 2 - 
 Light Duty 01/01/1995     
       
Chile Passenger cars 1/1/1995 2.11 0.25 0.62 0.125 
 
Light & Medium Duty 
(gvw < 3860 kg) 1/2/1995 6.2 0.5 1..43 0.16 
       
Costa Rica Gasoline passenger cars 
and light duty vehicles      
 < 1800 kg 1/1/1995 5.7 0.25 0.63 - 
 1800-2800 kg 1/1/1995 6.2 0.5 1.1 - 
 2800-6400 kg 1/1/1995 19.2 1.2 10.6 - 
 >6400 kg 1/1/1995 49.8 2.3 10.6 - 
       
Mexico Cars 1/1/1993 3.4 0.41 1 - 
 
light duty vehicles 
gvw < 6012 lb 1/1/1994 14 1 2.3 - 
 
light duty vehicles 
gvw 6013-6614 lb 1/1/1994 14 1 2.3 - 
Notes: (1) Diesel Vehicles only; (2) 1/1/99 for all new registrations; (3) PM 0.31 g/km for vehicles < 1700kg 
Source: CONCAWE (2006)  
 
The introduction of emission standards for both new and old cars, along with travel 
demand management programs, and regulatory measures such as vehicle inspection and 
maintenance programs (I/M), fuel specification, etc., have reduced vehicular emissions 
in Latin American countries. For example, in Mexico City, the total daily CO and NOx 
emissions from light and medium gasoline vehicle in 2000, were 48 percent and 26 
percent lower, respectively, from 1998 levels (Schifter et. al., 2005). 
 
4.5 Vehicle Emissions Standards in Asia 
 
Emission standards have been widely implemented in Asia. Some Asian countries 
(e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong) have introduced and strictly enforced stringent emission 
standards (Seik, 1996); others are yet to get there. Besides lower standards, strict 
enforcement is a major challenge in Asia. For example, China’s current limit (Euro II), 
as compared to the United States, is 26 percent higher for carbon monoxide and double 
for hydrocarbons. However, the proposed Euro II standards have not been met due to 
weak enforcement (Zhao, 2004). 
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Table 9: Exhaust Emission Regulations in Selected Countries. 
Country Vehicle type Fuel Effective date Equivalent 
Emission Limits 
Bangladesh Light & Heavy Duty 
Light & Heavy Duty 
Gasoline 
Diesel 
2006 
2006 
Euro II 
Euro I 
China(1) Light Duty (<3.5t)(2)-
National 
 
Passenger Cars & Light 
Duty (Beijing & Sanghai) 
Gasoline & 
Diesel 
1993 
 
 
July, 1999 
ECE 15.03 with 
higher limits 
 
Euro I 
Hong Kong Light Duty(3)  01/01/2006 Euro IV 
India Light Duty- National 
Light Duty-Delhi region 
 2000 
04/00 
91/441/EEC(4) 
Euro II 
Indonesia Gasoline engines 
Diesel engines 
 2005 
2005 
Euro II 
Euro II 
Malaysia Light Duty Gasoline 
Diesel 
01/01/00 
01/01/00 
94/12/EEC 
94/12/EEC 
Nepal Light Duty-Imported  01/02 Euro I 
Philippines Light Duty 
Medium & heavy duty 
 01/01/97 
01/01/97 
ECE R 15-04(5) 
ECE R 49-01 
Singapore Light Duty Gasoline 
Diesel 
01/2001 
10/2006 
Euro II 
Euro IV 
South Korea Gasoline 
Diesel 
  US procedures 
ECE R 49 
Sri Lanka Gasoline 
Diesel 
 01/01/2003 Euro II 
Taiwan Passenger Cars(6) 
Light duty(6) 
Gasoline 
Diesel 
07/90 US 1984 Limits 
US 1984 LDT 
Thailand Light Duty All(7) 25/08/2001 96/69/EC 
Saudi Arabia    ECE R 15.03 
equivalent 
Notes: (1) The Chinese State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) proposed the adoption of EU 
Directive 91/441/EEC in 2001. 
(2)
 A government notice, posted on 27 June 2001, required the immediate cessation of production of 
carbureted vehicles. Production was halted immediately and sales were banned from 1 September 2001. 
(3)
 Euro 3 or equivalent standards will apply to certain class of vehicles under3.5 tones on or after 1 
January 2002. From 1 January 2006, LD diesel must comply with Califorrnia regulations. Euro 4 
introduced from 01/01/2006 for vehicles up to 2.5 tones, extending to 3.5 tones from 01/01/2007. 
(4)
 Employs a modified Indian Driving cycle similar to the ECE15+EUDC cycle, except that the 
maximum speed is limited to 90 km/h. 
(5) Evaporative emission for spark ignition engines shall not exceed 2.0 grams per test. Crankcase 
emissions should be eliminated. 
(6)
 Evaporative emission for spark ignition engines shall not exceed 2.0 grams per test. 
(7)
 Proposed to the National Environment Board for implementation as follows: RM ≤1305 kg from 
January 2003; RM>1305 Kg from 1 January 2004. Implementation of Row B of 98 /69/EC (Euro 4) is 
under discussion. 
Source: CONCAWE (2006) 
 
Table 9 illustrates exhaust emissions regulations in selected Asian countries. 
Countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Singapore have 
introduced Euro standards, whereas Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Saudi Arabia have implemented U.S. emissions regulations. 
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In order to combat deteriorating urban air quality, China has adopted aggressive 
vehicle emissions standards. It imposed emissions standards equivalent to Euro 1 in 
2000 and aims at meeting current European emissions standards, with a lag of about 4–6 
years. (Bauner et al., 2008). The existing vehicle emissions standards adopted in Beijing 
are similar to Euro 2 standards (Deng, 2006). Euro 4 standards will kick in starting 2010 
(Liu et al., 2008). 
Like mainland China, Taiwan, too, has taken some bold steps towards containing 
transport sector emissions. The first stage emission standards for gasoline cars were 
introduced on 1 July 1987. In Taiwan, all passenger cars must pass emission standard 
tests for CO and HC during the idle phase at 0.5% and 100 ppm, respectively, for new 
cars and 1.2% and 220 ppm for in-use cars. Vehicle regulation requires all new 
passenger vehicles to have exhaust catalyst. It also requires all vehicles to undergo 
annual I/M tests to pass the emission standards (Chiang et al., 2008). 
Japan is another Asian country that has taken strong measures towards vehicular 
emission control. In addition to various fiscal instruments, Japan has put in place tough 
regulatory standards. Its emission standards are clearly on par with standards adopted in 
Europe and the United States. There are two sets of standards: the first one aimed at 
reducing pollution from vehicles below 1250 Kg and the second for vehicles weighing 
more than 1250 Kg. Table 10 illustrates the differences in these two sets of standards. 
Japan’s Central Environmental Council (CEC) published its third report on “Future 
policy for motor vehicle exhaust emission reduction” in December of 1998. It called for 
a further strengthening of NOx and PM limits for diesel engines in two stages and led to 
25-30 percent reduction in NOx emission and 28-35 percent reduction in PM emission 
from 2002-2004, depending on vehicle category. It required 70 percent reduction in HC 
and CO emissions (CONCAWE, 2006).  
Table 10: Japanese Emission Standards for Diesel Passenger Cars, g/km. 
Vehicle Weight Date Test CO HC NOx PM 
< 1250 kg* 2005b JC08c 0.63 0.024d 0.14 0.013 
 2009  0.63 0.024d 0.08 0.005 
       
> 1250 kg* 2002a  0.63 0.12 0.3 0.056 
 2005b JC08c 0.63 0.024d 0.15 0.014 
 2009  0.63 0.024d 0.08 0.005 
Notes: * - equivalent inertia weight (EIW); vehicle weight of 1265 kg. 
a - 2002.10 for domestic cars, 2004.09 for imports; b - full implementation by the end of 2005 
c - full phase-in by 2011; d - non-methane hydrocarbons. 
Source: CONCAWE, (2006), Diesenet (undated). 
 
 
5. Fuel Quality Standards 
 
Fuel quality standards play a crucial role in protecting public health and the 
environment from transport sector emissions. It is often viewed as an important 
component of an overall plan to improve air quality. Cleaner fuels have an immediate 
impact on both new and existing vehicle fleets. There is a close relationship between 
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fuel quality and emission control technologies, and it is also important for the successful 
adoption of stringent vehicle emission standards. The reduction of sulfur to near-zero 
levels is prerequisite for any air pollution reduction strategy to bear fruits (Hao et al., 
2006; Blumberg et al., 2003). 
Realizing the importance of cleaner fuel, countries started reducing the level of lead 
and sulfur in fuel in early the 1990s. Starting January 1995, leaded gasoline sales were 
banned in the United States. The maximum amount of lead permitted in unleaded 
gasoline in the United States is 0.013 grams/liter (CONCAWE, 2006). The Alliance of 
Auto Manufacturers, which represents the auto industry, supported a gasoline sulfur 
control program in 2004 and agreed to reduce sulfur content to “near-zero” levels (less 
than 5 mg/kg) by 2007 (CONCAWE, 2006). Similarly, leaded gasoline was banned in 
the EU effective from 1 January 2000, although some countries like Greece, Italy, and 
Spain had to be granted a grace period (Gwilliam et al., 2004). EU Directive 
2003/17/EC introduced a new sulfur requirement for both gasoline and diesel 
(maximum 10 mg/kg) and called for the complete penetration of these fuels from 1 
January 2009 (CONCAWE, 2006). 
Table 11: Gasoline Specification-Selected Developing Countries. 
Country Property Property 
 RON (Value Min.) Sulfur (mg/kg or ppm, Max) 
 Reg. Prem. Supreme Reg. Prem. Supreme 
Bangladesh 80 95  1000 1000  
India 88 93  1000 1000  
Malaysia 92 97  1500 1500  
Philippines - 93  1000 -  
Pakistan 80 87 97 2000 2000 2000 
Thailand 87 95  1000 1000 1000 
Kenya 83 93  500 500  
Tanzania 87 95  1500 1500  
Argentina 83 -  500 -  
Bolivia 85 95  500 500  
Colombia 81 87  1000 1000  
El Salvador 87 95  1500 1500  
Guatemala 87 95  1500 1500  
Honduras 87 95  1500 1500  
Mexico - 95  250-300 250-300  
Nicaragua 87 95  1000 1000  
Panama 87 91  1000 1000  
Paraguay 85 97  1000 1000  
Source: CONCAWE (2006). 
 
Table 11 illustrates specifications for unleaded gasoline in selected developing 
countries. Fuel quality regulations and specifications vary from one country to another. 
In countries like Mexico, the maximum allowable limit of sulfur in fuel is far lower than 
in countries such as Pakistan, India, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Malaysia, and 
Tanzania. In sub-Saharan Africa, lead was banned on 1 January 2006; the maximum 
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allowable limit is 13 mg/l (CONCAWE, 2006). Sulfur limits, especially in diesel, tend 
to be very high in Pakistan, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
China is taking aggressive steps towards containing hazardous components in fuel. By 
1998, the local government in Beijing successfully phased out leaded gasoline. At 
present, sulfur content ranges from 300 ppm to 500 ppm for gasoline and from 500 ppm 
to 800 ppm for diesel fuel in Beijing (Hao et. al., 2006). Since eliminating lead as an 
octane booster in gasoline is a relatively low cost measure with high returns in terms of 
public health, Gwalliam et al. (2004) suggested that it should be a high priority for all 
countries that have not yet eliminated lead from gasoline. 
The emission of sulfur dioxide from diesel used in heavy vehicles is one of the main 
environmental concerns in most countries around the world. Hence, these countries 
have imposed standards on the sulfur content of diesel. Table 12 presents existing or 
planned standards for the sulfur content of diesel in selected countries. As can be seen 
from the table, sulfur standards for diesel have been rapidly stiffened in many countries 
over the last decade. For example, the standards in the United States, Japan and 
European Union have been reduced to 50 ppm in 2005 from 500 ppm in 1996. In 
Australia, the standards have been reduced to 50 ppm in 2006 from 2000 ppm in 1996. 
The standards stiffened further to 10 ppm in Japan and European Union. In some 
developing countries, such as, India, Philippines, Vietnam, the standards for diesel 
sulfur content were reduced by 10 times during the 1996-2005 period. 
Table 12: Existing and Planned Standards for Diesel Sulfur Contents in Selected Countries. 
Unit: PPM (milligram of sulfur per kilogram of diesel). 
Country 1996 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 
USA 500        15    
EU 500   350    50   10  
Japan 500       50  10   
Australia 2,000    500    50    
Bangladesh >5000    5,000        
Cambodia >5000   2,000         
China 5,000 2,000           
India 5,000   2,500    500    350 
Indonesia 5,000            
South 
Korea 2,000 500           
Malaysia  5,000 3,000   500        
Pakistan 10,000    5,000        
Philippines 5,000   2,000   500      
Singapore  5,000 500           
Sri Lanka 5,000     3,000       
Thailand 2,500  500          
Vietnam 10,000     2,000  500     
Source: Krylov et al. (2005). 
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Although the costs and benefits associated with sulfur reduction vary from region to 
region, depending on the state of existing refineries, fuel quality, and emissions 
standards, the cost of sulfur reduction is affordable (Blumberg et. al., 2003). Some 
countries that import petroleum products might find it hard to maintain the required 
quality due to the lack of their own refineries. Consequently, developing countries 
without their own refineries may not be in a position to enforce fuel standard related 
regulations. Nepal, for example, lacking its own refinery, is dependent on imported 
petroleum products and is experiencing severe air pollution problems related to the high 
levels of benzene in imported gasoline (Kiuru, 2002). 
Table 13: Biofuels Blending Mandates. 
Country Ethanol Biodiesel 
Australia E2 in New South Wales, 
increasing to E10 by 2011; E5 
in Queensland by 2010 
 
Argentina E5 by 2010 B5 by 2010 
Bolivia  B2.5 by 2007 and B20 by 
2015 
Brazil E22-E25  B2 by 2008 and B5 by 2013 
Canada E5 by 2010; E7.5 in 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba; 
E5 by 2007 in Ontario 
B2 by 2012 
China E10 in 9 provinces  
Colombia E10 B5 by 2008 
Dominican Republic E15 by 2015 B2 by 2015 
Germany E2 by 2007 B4.4 by 2007; B5.75 by 2010 
India E10 in 13 states/territories  
Italy E1 B1 
Malaysia  B5 by 2008 
Paraguay  B1 by 2007, B3 by 2008, and 
B5 by 2009 
Peru E7.8 by 2010 nationally; 
starting regionally by 2006  
B5 by 2010 nationally; 
starting regionally by 2008 
Philippines E5 by 2008; E10 by 2011 B1 by 2008; B2 by 2011 
South Africa E8-E10 (proposed) B2-B5 (proposed) 
Thailand E10 by 2007 3 percent share by 2011  
United Kingdom E2.5 by 2008; E5 by 2010 B2.5 by 2008; B5 by 2010 
United States E10 in Iowa, Hawaii, Missouri, 
and Montana; E20 in 
Minnesota; E2 in Louisiana 
and Washington State  
B5 in New Mexico; B2 in 
Louisiana and Washington 
State 
Uruguay E5 by 2014 B2 (2008-2011) and B5 by 
2012 
Note: Targets with no dates are already in place except in some U.S. states where the targets are expected 
to be effective in future years. There are other countries with future indicative targets that are not shown 
here. 
Source: Worldwatch Institute (2008). 
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Another important standard imposed on fuels in many countries is the minimum 
blending requirement of gasoline and diesel with ethanol and bio-diesel, respectively. 
Although energy security could be the primary purpose of such blending, reducing 
environmental externalities, particularly CO2 emissions, is an equally important benefit. 
Table 13 presents examples of biofuels blending regulations in selected industrialized 
and developing countries. Most of these regulations were enacted quite recently, and 
they typically call for the blending of 10–15 percent ethanol with gasoline or the 
blending of 2–5 percent biodiesel with diesel. The provinces of British Columbia and 
Quebec in Canada have also announced that they would mandate ethanol blending but 
exact blending percentages are yet to be stipulated. Brazil has mandated the blending of 
biofuels for 30 years through its “ProAlcool” program; while the blending shares for 
ethanol were adjusted occasionally, they have remained in the 20-25 percent range. 
 
 
6. Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Programs  
 
Inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs are largely devised to identify primary 
“gross polluters” and ensure that they are retrofitted or retired. Be it developed or 
developing countries, vehicles that are not properly maintained are responsible for a 
large fraction of total transport sector emissions. Based on a cross country study of CO 
and HC emissions from over 200,000 vehicles in the USA, Canada, Mexico, the UK, 
and Sweden, Guenther et al. (1994) found that less than 10 percent of the fleet, which 
are referred to as “gross polluters,” are responsible for half of the total emissions. 
Likewise, around 10–12 percent of the existing vehicle fleet accounted for about 50 
percent of transport sector CO emissions in Nepal from 2001-2002 (Faiz et al., 2006). 
Therefore, the problem of a small percentage of ill-maintained vehicles diluting the 
gains made through higher fuel, emissions, and fuel economy standards is not a 
developed or developing countries’ problem; it is a global problem that calls for 
innovative ways to discourage “gross polluters” from getting on the roadways. 
Although I/M programs have been widely implemented in both the developed and 
developing word, there is no universal consensus on the use of I/M programs to regulate 
vehicle emissions. Faiz et al. (1990) and Mage and Walsh (1992) emphasized the 
importance of I/M programs. According to Faiz et al. (1990), without a rigorous I/M 
program, smoke and particulate emissions from often overloaded and poorly maintained 
diesel-powered vehicles cannot be controlled in developing countries. Mage and Walsh 
(1992) argued that I/M programs are critical for controlling emissions from both new 
car and in-use vehicles. Gwalliam (2004) and Kebin and Chang (1999), based on 
experiences from Mexico City and China, considered I/M programs a success. The I/M 
system introduced in Mexico city with high volume, centralized test centers is an 
example of a successful program on a large scale (Gwalliam, 2004). In Beijing, 
according to Kebin and Chang, (1999), emissions decreased a total of 28 to 40 percent, 
and in Shanghai, CO and HC emission concentrations decreased on average by 39 
percent. Like in Beijing, the I/M program introduced in 1992 in the Lower Fraser Valley 
of the Canadian province of British Columbia, led to reduction in HC emissions by 20 
percent, CO by 20 percent, and NOx by 1 percent (Faiz et al., 1995). Contrary to the 
aforementioned studies, Hubbard (1997) argued that the existing I/M programs in the 
United States have generated, at most, small environmental benefits. 
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Despite some criticisms, I/M programs have been widely implemented. In the United 
States, California was the first the state that implemented a wide-ranging test and repair 
I/M program in 1984. It required gasoline-powered automobiles to pass inspections 
every two years (Faiz et al., 1995). In other states, depending upon the state’s 
performance standards, motorists have to satisfy I/M requirements (Harrington et al., 
2000). 
Within the European Union, the member states have implemented the requirements of 
the Roadworthiness Framework Directive. It requires vehicle owners to go for a 
compulsory vehicle inspection and is enforced to ensure the necessary maintenance and 
upkeep of vehicles (CCAP, 2004). EU Directive 96/96/EC regulates I/M programs and 
safety inspections. The directive also provides some leeway to the member states in 
terms of: (i) setting higher frequency of tests; (ii) making the testing of optional 
equipment compulsory; (iii) expanding test requirements to other classes of vehicles; 
and, (iv) prescribing additional or more stringent tests (USAID, 2004). 
In Australia, a pilot I/M scheme was introduced in July 1998 in the greater Sydney 
area. Its main aim was to include all light duty vehicle by the year 2000. The main goal 
of the National In-service Emissions (NISE2) study was to establish a primary phase 
and a main phase testing that would aid in the establishment of the current emissions 
performance of light duty petrol vehicles (CONCAWE, 2006). The primary phase was 
designed to develop and validate reliable emission tests for light duty gasoline vehicles 
that are based on “real world” driving patterns. It was intended to provide the basic tools 
for use in the main phase for generating a more accurate and representative measure of 
the actual amount of pollutants emitted from the light duty gasoline fleet (CONCAWE, 
2006). 
China’s I/M programs require regular inspections, which include yearly inspections, 
first-class maintenance, second class maintenance, and vehicle overhaul. In big cities 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, I/M programs have been effective, to a large 
degree, in lowering vehicle emissions (Kebin and Chang, 1999). 
Despite their emission reduction potential, I/M programs have certain limitations, 
which are primarily on two fronts: (i) inefficient use of resources and inconvenience to 
motorists; and, (ii) infectiveness in identifying gross polluting vehicles (Calvert et al., 
1993; Bishop et al., 1997). Lack of proper enforcement, and corruption, prevents the 
realization of the full potential of any I/M program. Moreover, the lack of capacity, such 
as the lack of training of personnel, and poor quality test equipment, can hinder the 
success of the program. India is a classic example of how the lack of a well-conceived 
program defeats the overall objectives of the program [USAID, 2004]3. In Nepal, 
between 16–32 percent of vehicles failed the emissions test from 2000–2002 (Faiz et al., 
2006). In Chongqing, China, only 10 percent of vehicles brought in by drivers failed the 
emissions test, but 40 percent of vehicles flagged down by roadside inspectors did not 
pass the emission test (USAID, 2004). 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Indian I/M programs are plagued by poor quality personnel and test equipment, low compliance rates, 
and corruption. I/M tests are not taken by more than 15 percent of drivers and those who take it pass 
without truly controlling their emissions (USAID, 2004). 
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7. Other Laws and Regulations 
 
Although policies such as fuel economy standards, emission standards, fuel quality 
standards, and I/M programs are most frequently utilized, they are by no means the only 
regulatory instruments introduced to discourage travel demand and reduce emissions 
from the transport sector. Several other regulatory measures have been experimented 
with, to varying degrees of success. For example, access bans, or partial and total 
vehicle bans, have been widely used in European countries such as Italy, Greece, The 
Netherlands, Spain, and Germany (Goddard, 1997). Italy has adopted a policy that bans 
private cars from entering the city centers. Italy aims to protect its historical city centers 
by not allowing non-residents to drive into the city center. In Swiss cities such as Bern 
and Zurich, the restrictive measures taken by the government (e.g., limited parking, road 
capacity reduction and diversion of through traffic) has made driving so difficult that 
many Swiss prefer using public transport (Bonnel, 1995). 
The “No- Driving Day” (NDD) (or Hoy No Circula) policy introduced in Mexico City 
in 1989 is one of the much-discussed regulatory measures to control traffic congestion 
and vehicular emissions. It would not only help reduce environmental externalities 
through travel management but also reduce traffic congestion (Molina and Molina, 
2004). The program mandates not driving one day during the week (except the 
weekends) and two days during serious pollution episodes. During the weekends, odd 
and even license plate numbers are used, which forced one-half of the fleet to be parked. 
By removing 20 percent of the vehicles from the streets in its first few months of 
operation, it did contribute towards the betterment of ambient air quality (Goddard, 
1997). The gains made, however, were temporary. The program did not yield the 
desired level of success for several reasons. First, the city lacked sufficient public 
transport systems to meet the travel demand resulting from the ban on personal vehicles. 
Second, the driving public intelligently subverted the existing regulation. For example, 
many drivers adjusted to the restriction by purchasing additional autos in order to have 
at least one vehicle available on any given day. Many of the second vehicles were older 
and released more emissions. Some studies (e.g., Eskeland, 1994; Eskeland and 
Feyzioglu, 1995; Goddard, 1997) even argued that the program actually may have led to 
an increase in the number of vehicles and total emissions from road transport. 
In addition to Mexico city, the traffic restriction (restricción vehicular) policy has 
been implemented in three different Latin American cities: Santiago (Chile), São Paulo 
(Brazil), and Bogotá (Colombia), with varying degree of success. The traffic restriction 
policy in Santiago implemented to reduce congestion and air pollution has limited the 
circulation of 20% of buses, taxis, and cars. In order to combat free rider problem, the 
schedule for the restriction is changed every few months. In São Paulo, the effects of the 
traffic ban have been undermined by growing car ownership. In order to meet air quality 
targets, Mexico City authorities are planning modifications to the existing scheme to 
ensure stricter enforcement with fewer exemptions (Mahendra, 2007). 
Many Latin American countries have imposed complete or partial bans on used 
vehicles imports. Despite a huge market for used vehicles, countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela have 
completely banned used vehicle imports (Pelletiere and Reinert, 2002). 
The Supreme Court of India has played a proactive role in controlling vehicular 
pollution in New Delhi. Its directives include: (i) the phasing out of 
commercial/transport vehicles older than 15 years; (ii) the replacement of all pre-1990 
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autos and taxis with new vehicles using clean fuel; and, (iii) the conversion of the entire 
city bus fleet, both public and private, to use compressed natural gas (CNG) (DOT, 
2009). The Supreme Court order for the conversion of the entire diesel-powered bus 
fleet in Delhi and its successful implementation clearly shows that reluctance on the part 
of the government in developing countries in maintaining air quality can be overcome 
through the judicial system. 
In many large U.S. cities, regulation such as high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes and 
high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes have been introduced. These regulations help reduce 
emissions in two ways: (i) encouraging an increased vehicle occupancy and (ii) 
encouraging the use of clean vehicles (hybrids) and vehicles with higher fuel efficiency 
(motor cycles) as such vehicles are allowed in HOV and HOT lanes. Until recently, ten 
US States have considered allowing single occupant hybrid vehicles (SOHV) into HOV 
lanes (Chu et al., 2007). Although well intentioned, allowing hybrid vehicles in HOV 
lanes have started to produce negative externality in the form of increased congestion in 
HOV lanes. For example in Virginia, USA, where motorcycles and hybrid vehicles are 
allowed to take advantage of HOV facilities statewide, traffic congestion experienced 
by the commutersc. In a survey conducted in 2002, vanpoolers cited Congestion in 
HOV lanes as their second greatest concern has been increasing (Poole and Balaker, 
2005). Increased congestion also means increase in pollution.  
 
 
8. Which regulatory instruments and where? 
 
The literature on the design of regulatory policies to reduce transport sector 
externalities mainly focus on two central questions: (i) the desired level of protection of 
public health and environmental quality that a country or region is aiming to achieve 
and (ii) the cost and institutional capacity to implement the policies. Based on intent of 
the program(s), easing congestion or controlling pollution, the appropriateness of the 
regulatory instrument(s) under consideration may vary considerably. Factors that 
influence the effectiveness of the instrument should be used to gauge the 
appropriateness of the regulatory measure (Ghose, 2002; Satyanarayana, 2007). The 
selection of an instrument does not guarantee its effectiveness. The success of the 
selected instrument relies on factors such as: (i) the overall costs of emission control; 
(ii) the comprehensiveness of the law/regulations with regard to the level of 
development of the society; (iii) the ability of the industry in question to bear the control 
cost burden; and, (iv) the punitive measures in place and the chances of detection of 
violation (Priyadarshini and Gupta, 2003). 
The choice of control options is based on the country’s priorities, the characteristics of 
the air pollution problem and the resources of the regulating agency (Cohen and 
Kamieniecki, 1991; Faiz and de Larderel, 1993). Take countries or cities facing severe 
local air pollution problems, for example. Most developing countries normally introduce 
emissions standards, whereas developed countries, which are equally concerned with 
both global and local air pollution, adopt a myriad of regulatory measures, such as fuel 
economy and fuel standards, in addition to emission standards. Since most developing 
countries are particularly concerned about local air pollution, they tend to prioritize the 
introduction of emissions standards and fuel quality standards over fuel economy 
standards. Moreover, implementation of emissions and fuel quality standards is 
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technologically simple with greater certainty of the desired outcome. In addition, except 
for few developing countries such as India, China, and Brazil which have automobile 
manufacturing plants and where setting fuel economy standards is more desirable, 
others are net importers of automobile and therefore they do not have control over the 
fuel economy standards4. 
Regulatory standards vary considerably from one country to another depending upon 
the level of motorization, dependency on private vehicles, and environmental 
consciousness. Fuel economy standards across European countries and between the 
United States and the EU vary significantly. Most developing countries are found to be 
reluctant to introduce stringent regulatory standards because of their limited resources to 
enforce the stringent standards (Cohen and Kamienicki, 1991; Priyadarshini and Gupta, 
2003; Delfin, 2004). 
Note here that regulatory standards are not mutually exclusive to each other in that 
introduction of an instrument does not obviate the need for others. For example, 
emission standards are necessary to control local air pollutants such as CO, HC, NOx, 
and fine particulate matter. Control devices reducing these emissions do not necessarily 
reduce fuel consumption and CO2 emissions and, hence, emission standards do not 
replace fuel economy standards. Similarly, emission standards may not replace fuel 
quality standards. 
As the level of air pollution varies from one city to another, depending upon the level 
of motorization, compactness of the city, and maintenance level of the existing vehicle 
stock, most developing countries are struggling to make the selection of appropriate 
regulatory instruments that can effectively reduce emissions from the transport sector. 
One of the major questions, whose answer seems elusive for most, is what is the starting 
point in terms of framing effective policy instruments in reducing transport sector 
emissions? There seems to be no clear-cut answer to this question. There are, however, 
several worthy suggestions (Gwalliam, 2004; Mage and Walsh, 1992; ADB, 2003; 
Blumberg et al., 2003). 
Understanding the factors affecting the total inventory of motor vehicle emissions is 
necessary to design effective programs. The ADB (2003) suggested that countries with 
a serious air pollution problem strongly consider leapfrogging to the most stringent 
standards possible, such as the Euro 2, Euro 3 or Euro 4, after making sure that the 
appropriate fuel is available. Blumberg et al. (2003) argued that jumping to near-zero 
sulfur diesel in a single step is more cost-effective and advantageous. The suggestions, 
although genuine, may not be always feasible due to the lack of resources, trained labor, 
and the required infrastructure. For example, one of the major difficulties associated 
with vehicle emission control programs is that it imposes significant economic and 
social costs (Gwalliam, 2004) and the actual beneficiaries are hard to identify (Faiz et 
al., 1999). 
Motor vehicle pollution control programs should be based on a realistic assessment of 
costs and benefits and must be compared with the technical and administrative 
feasibility of proposed countermeasures. In order to make services affordable to the 
poor, transport policy must be designed to be both environmentally sensitive and 
consistent with public and private affordability. 
 
                                                 
4
 However, they can impose import restrictions for low fuel economy vehicles. 
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9. Conclusions 
 
This study reviews the main regulatory policy instruments to control transport sector 
externalities. The instruments considered include fuel economy standards, emission 
standards, fuel quality standards and other laws and regulations. We also highlight 
factors affecting the selection of regulatory instruments. 
Fuel economy standards have generally been introduced in developed countries, 
which are not only concerned about local air pollutions but also other factors such as 
traffic congestion, climate change, and energy security. In the United States, fuel 
economy standards were first introduced in the early 1970s in an effort to lessen the 
impacts of the first oil crisis. Currently, the policy also serves to reduce GHG emissions. 
The fuel economy standard in the U.S. has not improved, however, since the 1985 level 
of 27.5 MPG, although the 2007 Energy Bill mandates an improvement to 35 MPG by 
2020. In contrast to United States, the EU has defined fuel economy in terms of GHG 
emissions due to the increasing contribution of urban transportation to global GHG 
emissions. Implementation of the EU fuel economy standards will result in the 
reduction of vehicular CO2 emission from 186 g/km in 1995 to 140 g/km in 2008 and 
further to 120 g/km by 2012. 
Although the fuel economy standard is one of the key regulatory instruments 
employed in industrialized countries to reduce transport sector externalities, its success 
has been contested. Some existing literature argue that equivalent fiscal policy 
instruments, such as fuel or emission taxes, could have produced better results than fuel 
economy standards while reducing the same amount of fuel consumption and emissions. 
While the fuel economy standards help reduce fuel consumption and associated 
emissions, particularly CO2 emissions, they do not necessarily reduce local and regional 
air pollutants, such as CO, VOC, NOx, and SPM to the level necessary to meet local air 
quality standards in many cities around the world. 
Emission standards have been introduced in both industrialized and developing 
countries to control local air pollution. In response to the increase in local pollution 
level, vehicle emission standards have consistently been tightened over the years. 
Starting in 2004, tailpipe emissions standard for NOx has been set at 0.07 grams per 
mile in the U.S. (compared to 3.1 grams per mile in 1975). In the EU, there have been 
quick revisions in the emission standards towards advanced standards. The Euro 1 
standards introduced in the early 1990s were modified to Euro 2 in 1996, to Euro 3 in 
2000 and finally to Euro 4 in 2005. Following the footsteps of the industrialized 
countries, developing countries too have made commendable progress in terms of 
adopting emission standards. Several countries in Latin America and Asia have adopted 
either Euro or U.S. emission standards to control their local air pollution. 
In order to control some pollutants, such as lead and oxides of sulfur, the element 
causing these pollutants needs to be limited through fuel quality standards. Most 
countries around the world have phased out leaded gasoline and controlled lead content 
in unleaded gasoline. Similarly, many countries, both industrialized and developing, 
have introduced fuel quality standards to limit sulfur content, thereby reducing oxides of 
sulfur and particulate matter. Moreover, several countries have introduced mandates for 
blending ethanol and biodiesel into, respectively, gasoline and diesel. This would 
certainly help reduce CO2 and some local air pollutants. 
Setting vehicular standards does not necessarily control emissions unless an effective 
enforcement mechanism is in place, however. Inspection and maintenance (I/M) 
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programs are the most common initiatives countries have undertaken to enforce the 
standards. The programs mandate regular inspection of vehicles and retirement of those 
not meeting the standards. Besides standards, there also exist some regulatory measures, 
such as import ban on polluting vehicles in many Latin American countries, partial and 
complete driving restrictions in some European cities, the no driving day program in 
Mexico City and the mandatory conversion of public bus in New Delhi from diesel to 
compressed natural gas (CNG). 
Fuel economy standards, emission standards, fuel quality standards and I/M programs 
are not mutually exclusive and they are introduced for different purposes. Different 
countries could give priority to different measures depending upon their needs and 
institutional capacity to enforce the standards. Since most developing countries are 
particularly concerned about local air pollution, they are found to prioritize the 
introduction of emissions standards and fuel quality standards over fuel economy 
standards. 
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Appendix 
 
Acronyms 
 
 
CO  Carbon Monoxide 
EPCA Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
EPCA European Automobile Manufacturers Association 
EC  European Commission 
EU  European Union 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
GVWR Gross Vehicle Weight Rating 
HC  Hydrocarbon 
JAMA Japanese Manufacturers 
KAMA Korean Manufacturers 
MPG Miles Per Gallon 
NAFC National Average Fuel Consumption 
NMOC Non-metallic Organic Compounds 
NOx  Oxides of Nitrogen 
SOx  Oxides of Sulfur 
SPM  Suspended particulate matters 
CAFE The Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
FCAI The Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries 
VMT Vehicle Miles Traveled 
VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds 
